We consider the problem of minimizing the communication in single-database private information retrieval protocols in the case where the length of the data to be transmitted is large. We present first rate-optimal protocols for 1-out-of-n computationallyprivate information retrieval (CPIR), oblivious transfer (OT), and strong conditional oblivious transfer (SCOT). These protocols are based on a new optimalrate leveled homomorphic encryption scheme for largeoutput polynomial-size branching programs, that might be of independent interest. The analysis of the new scheme is intricate: the optimal rate is achieved if a certain parameter s is set equal to the only positive root of a degree-(m + 1) polynomial, where m is the length of the branching program. We show, by using Galois theory, that even when m = 4, this polynomial cannot be solved in radicals. We employ the Newton-Puiseux algorithm to find a Puiseux series for s, and based on this, propose a Θ(log m)-time algorithm to find an integer approximation to s.
Introduction
In a computational private information retrieval (CPIR) protocol [22] a client receives one -bit database element from an n-element database maintained by a server. It is required that the server should not gain any knowledge of which element was transferred to the client, and that the communication of the protocol should be smaller than that of the trivial protocol where the server just sends the whole database to the client. There exists a long line of works that improve on communication efficiency aspects of CPIR protocols [3, 18, 19, 25, 26, 37] .
Usually, one strives to improve the communicationefficiency as a function of the database size n. In this paper, we focus on optimizing the communication of a CPIR protocol in the case where is especially large, and the communication overhead plays a dominant role in the usability of the protocol. We are motivated by an example application where the client has paid the server for downloading a movie (assuming all movies cost the same) and does not want the server to know which movie she is going to download. In such an application, one can easily have 10 9 while n is not more than say 10 5 .
The communication complexity of non-private information retrieval is log 2 n + . Hence, the communication rate of a CPIR protocol is (log 2 n + )/L, where L is the communication of the CPIR protocol. Simply put, the rate of a CPIR protocol measures the communication-efficiency loss that the protocol suffers due to the added privacy requirement.
The CPIR protocol of Gentry and Ramzan [18] achieves rate 1 4 . The best previous rate, 1 2 , CPIR protocol was proposed by Lipmaa [26] . In practice, given a database consisting of very large database elements, even a rate-1 2 CPIR protocol can be prohibitively wasteful. On the other hand, optimizing the rate is very interesting from a theoretical viewpoint. In particular, optimizing the rate and constructing rate-optimal protocols is one of the focus points in areas like coding theory, where one's goal is often to obtain encoding rate that is optimal, or near-optimal (e.g., different from the optimal by a sub-constant factor; in what follows we will not distinguish between optimal and near-optimal rate).
We thus ask the following fundamental question:
Main question: Is it possible to construct a CPIR protocol with a rate 1 − o(1), i.e., with a rate that is close to the rate of a non-private retrieval protocol?
No such protocol is known or easy to derive from the existing solutions.
Given a CPIR protocol with rate r, it is also natural to ask whether one can construct other, related, protocols with rate that is close to r. Probably the most natu-ral such protocol to consider is oblivious transfer (OT). Informally, an OT protocol is just a CPIR protocol with an additional security guarantee that the client will obtain information only about one database element.
For example, in the motivating scenario the server would not like the client to obtain two movies for the price of one. (Intuitively, a rate-1 CPIR protocol cannot reveal more than one database element. However, say in the case of a database of movies, it can reveal the best bits -e.g., no advertisements or closing credits -of both. This can be undesirable, and thus one would still require an OT protocol.) While various round-preserving CPIR-to-OT transformations have been proposed [1, 23, 29] , no previous work compared them from the viewpoint of rate preservation.
Finally, in a strong conditional oblivious transfer (SCOT, [2] ) protocol, the client obtains f Q (x,y) , where Q is a public predicate and x, y are private inputs of the client and the server respectively. This generalizes CPIR and OT in the case where the selection strategy of the client is not described as 1-out-of-n but as a more complex relation. Constructing a rate-1 SCOT is an equally interesting and wide open problem.
We are not aware of any computation-efficient generic CPIR-to-SCOT transformations that preserve the rate. In fact, a SCOT protocol intuitively requires the server to execute a secure computation of Q, without getting to know the result. Hence, a rate-optimal SCOT primitive for a certain class C of languages is intuitively equivalent to a rate-optimal public-key homomorphic encryption scheme for C.
The rate of a regular public-key encryption scheme, defined as |x|/|Enc(x)|, as a function of = |x| is typically of no great concern in cryptography, because there exists a trivial construction achieving rate close to one via hybrid encryption. However, the latter does not preserve any homomorphic property that Enc(·) may have. In fact, fully homomorphic encryption schemes (introduced in [17] ) have very low and typically sub-constant rate, see [8] for a recent analysis of the parameters.
The only currently known rate-1 homomorphic cryptosystems due to Damgård and Jurik [11, 12] allow only an additive homomorphic property, i.e., homomorphic evaluation of arithmetic circuits with only addition gates. No rate-optimal homomorphic cryptosystems are known for more expressive language classes.
Our Contributions
To construct rate-optimal CPIR (and SCOT) protocols, we initiate the study of good rate homomorphic encryption schemes for non-trivial classes of languages. We propose an optimal-rate homomorphic encryption scheme for the class of functions (not necessarily predicates) that can be computed by polynomial-size branching programs. The new construction is a variation of older constructions [20, 25, 26] ; however, the concrete variation and the accompanied performance analysis needed to optimize various parameters are novel. We then show how our construction can be used to optimize the communication of cryptographic tasks such as CPIR assuming that is large enough.
More precisely, we consider the class LBP of functions f that can be implemented by polynomial-size (large-output) branching programs. In this case, the client has an input x, the server has a branching program P f that computes f , and the client will obtain f (x) while the server obtains no information about x. Since we are mainly interested in concrete applications like CPIR and SCOT, we make some assumptions that are natural in such applications. Namely, we assume that m, (a sufficiently close upper bound on) the length of P f , is known to the client before she sends an encryption Enc(x) to the server. Due to this assumption, we call the new homomorphic encryption scheme leveled. As usual in homomorphic encryption schemes, the server then applies an evaluation function Eval to P f and Enc(x), and then returns the result Eval(P f , Enc(x)) to the client.
Motivated by the applications, we say that the communication of the homomorphic encryption scheme is equal to the length of the useful information divided by the total communication, i.e.,
The main reason the knowledge of m is public is that this allows both the client and the server to choose precise parameters to optimize the rate. We construct an LBP-homomorphic PKE scheme that evaluates efficiently any (leveled) branching program P f for a function f : {0, 1} χ → {0, 1} where we assume that P f has length (= the maximum number of levels) m. Our construction has rate
where w is the arity of the branching program and k is the security parameter. Our construction follows the paradigm of [22] as applied in [20] to branching program evaluation, with an array of crucial optimizations that are tailored to the goal of achieving the optimal rate. In [20, 25, 26] , one recursively applies a basic (w, 1)-CPIR, for a small w, that is based on the cryptosystem of [11] . The basic CPIR has linear communication (unavoidable by the lower bound of [32] ) but importantly, it has a short answer from the server. Every recursion level i defines a length parameter s i (intuitively, this means that the plaintexts on this level belong to N si ,
where N is an RSA modulus); in all the aforementioned constructions the values s i are strictly increasing. Via our analysis using technique from multivariable calculus we show this setting is sub-optimal and, in fact, the optimal rate is achievable if the parameters s 1 , . . . , s m are all equal. In more detail, we show that the optimal communication results from choosing s as the unique positive root of the degree-
and σ = (w − 1)kχ/( m) for some integer w ≥ 2 (in the case of usual branching programs, w = 2). Finding the root is impossible analytically when m > 3. In Sect. 6, we use basic Galois theory to show that, for example, one cannot solve f 4 (x, 1) = 0 in radicals. Instead, we use the Newton-Puiseux algorithm [39] to compute the Puiseux series
We then construct a simple algorithm that, given the first two partial sums of the Puiseux series, computes an integer approximation to the optimal s in log 2 m steps. This analysis is very intricate and we consider it to be one of our main contributions. The whole approach seems to be novel in the context of the design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. In particular, we are not aware of any previous use of Galois-theory based impossibility results or of the Newton-Puiseux algorithm in cryptography.
To sum it up, the main difference of the new construction, as compared to [20, 25, 26] is the use of a single well-chosen parameter s = s 1 = · · · = s m . It is rather surprising that a simple modification like ours allows to achieve optimal rate. That optimal rate is achievable becomes clear only after extensive analysis of the parameters as explained above.
Applications
Based on the new rate-optimal LHE scheme, we show how to construct rate-optimal CPIR, OT, and SCOT protocols. First, we construct an (n, 1)-CPIR protocol with communication + 1.72 log 2 n · √ k + O(1) and an optimal rate 1 − 1.72 log 2 n · k/ + O( −1 ). This protocol just applies our new LHE scheme by using a complete 5-ary decision tree. The choice of 5-ary branching programs is somewhat unexpected, but follows from analysis. Hence, we answer positively to the previous "main question" of the current paper. We propose concrete parameter choices for the new CPIR protocol, demonstrating that in an application where a client wants to privately retrieve a 2.56GB movie from the server's database of 5 7 = 78125 movies, one can obtain rate 0.99. We construct an optimal-rate semisimulatable OT protocol based on the CPIR-to-OT transformation by Naor and Pinkas [29] . The resulting OT protocol is only computationally secure for the server; we leave the construction of an information-theoretically server-private optimal-rate OT protocol as an interesting open problem. Alternatively, we note that one can use zero knowledge proofs to obtain an optimal-rate 2-message simulatable OT protocol in the random oracle model.
We outline how to construct an optimal-rate SCOT protocol for any predicate that can be implemented by a (large-output) polynomial-size branching program.
We note that recently, [21] applied the rate-optimal SCOT protocol from the current paper to construct a rate-1 asymmetric fingerprinting scheme.
Computation
Another important aspect of a CPIR protocol is the server's computation. While this is not a focus of the current work, we remark that the new protocol fares better than the CPIR protocols of [25, 26] also in this aspect. This is since instead of encrypting at least -bit strings, we encrypt in suitably small segments. Since encryption takes superquadratic time, we thus save significantly in computation. We make this claim concrete in Sect. 8 where we show that (for parameters interesting to us, i.e., for large ) the new CPIR protocol is significantly (an off-hand calculation results in a factor of 10 5 times) faster than the CPIR protocol of [25] .
We describe one possible strategy that allows us to further significantly optimize the server's computation, while decreasing its rate only marginally. Given the same parameter settings as mentioned in Sect. 1.2, decreasing the rate less than two times (to 0.52, which is still better than the rate in any previous CPIR protocol) results in 2 12 times better server's computation. Such a dramatic optimization is possible due to the precise construction of the new CPIR protocol. We stress that the above results still require high computation on the server side. Even the optimized CPIR protocol is computationally too inefficient (in Sect. 8, we talk about 2 14 operations per bit of database data for the honest server). Note that multi-server PIR protocols offer a weaker privacy guarantee compared to the CPIR setting since privacy only holds if at least one server remains honest. It is a very interesting open question to define and achieve communication optimality under such more relaxed privacy guarantees while at the same time achieving the computational complexity benefits that usually accompany this setting.
Another interesting open question is to finding other, perhaps application-dependent, trade-offs between the rate and server's computation. See [14, 15, 31] for some relevant work.
The major (computational) bottleneck in our construction is the use of the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem. The major open question posed by the current paper is to construct a computationally more efficient rate-1 additively homomorphic cryptosystem.
Roadmap
In Sect. 2, we describe necessary preliminaries like branching programs, public-key encryption, and CPIR. In Sect. 3, we define the security and efficiency of a LHE scheme. In Sect. 4, we give the new parameterized construction of the new LHE scheme. In Sect. 5, we outline our strategy in optimizing the parameters, and state the communication complexity and the rate given the optimal parameters; we also describe an efficient algorithm for finding an integer approximation to the optimal parameters. In Sect. 7, we describe how to construct rate-optimal CPIR, OT, and SCOT protocols. Finally, in Sect. 8, we comment on the computational complexity of the CPIR protocol. Most of the mathematical details are given in the appendix.
Preliminaries
Since we are often interested in the growth of a function in several variables, we write the relevant variable as a subscript in Landau notation, like in o ( log n). Let k be the security parameter, i.e., we assume that adversaries work in probabilistic polynomial-time w.r.t. k. The current recommendation is to take k ≥ 2048. If not specified, all logarithms take basis 2; we denote the natural logarithm of x by ln x. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then we write a ← A(x; r), where r is the randomizer. If r is omitted, then it is chosen uniformly at random. 
Branching Programs
A w-ary branching program [40] is a fanout-w directed acyclic graph (V, E), where the non-terminal (that is, non-sink) nodes are indexed by variables from some variable set {X 1 , . . . , X χ }, the sinks are labeled bybit strings and the w outgoing edges of every internal node are indexed by values from 0 to w − 1. We denote by L v the label of the node v, by ind(v) the index of the (internal) node v. Since the new leveled LHE scheme also computes labels of internal nodes, in our case the difference between indexes and labels is strict. Usually, it is assumed that a branching program has 1-bit sink labels; then it can be assumed to have two terminal nodes. A large-output branching program ( Fig. 1 for some examples. For a branching program P , let len(P ) be its length (that is, the length of its longest path), size(P ) be its size (that is, the number of non-terminal nodes). Let BP(f ) be the minimal size of any branching program computing f . A Boolean function f has a polynomialsize branching program iff f belongs to L/poly [9] , the complexity class of logarithmic space machines with a polynomial amount of advice. Branching program for functions f : {0, 1} χ → {0, 1} with non-Boolean output can be constructed in a natural way. P is a decision tree if the underlying graph is a tree. P is leveled if its set of nodes can be divided into disjoint sets V d such that every edge from a node in set V d ends in a node in set V d−1 . An oblivious branching program is a leveled branching program in which all nodes of the same level are indexed by the same variable X i . Each branching program can be efficiently transformed into a leveled branching program of the same length and quadratic size [36] ; similarly, there exists an efficient transformation that makes a leveled branching program oblivious. In our applications, we start with a branching program that is oblivious and thus requires no additional transformation. We assume that the source is the only member of the set V m . Let size(P, d) be the number of nodes P has on level d, thus size(P, m) = 1.
The class LBP contains all functions f : {0, . . . , w− 1} χ → {0, 1} for which we have a large-output branching program with size that is polynomial on both parameters χ and |f ({0, . . . , w − 1} χ )|.
Throughout the paper, P f is a fixed leveled wary branching program that implements f : {0, 1} χ → {0, 1} . For any node v, let len(v) be its length, i.e., len(v) = len(P f ) −d, whered is the distance from the source to v. Thus v ∈ V len(v) , and the source has length len(P f ). (E.g., on Fig. 1 (left) , all sinks have length 0 and the source has length 4.) For a non-sink v, let child(v, i) for i ∈ [0, w−1] be its ith leftmost child, and X ind(v) be the index of v (that is,
Assume that the nodes of P f are ordered from 1 to size(P f ) so that if there exists an edge u → v then v < u. Assume that P f has n sinks. Hence, the first n nodes v ≤ n are the sinks and the last node v = size(P f ) is the source of P f . Recall that the description of P f also contains the labels L v of the sinks of P f .
Public-Key Cryptosystem
A public-key cryptosystem Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) consists of three polynomial-time algorithms, a probabilistic key generating algorithm (pk, sk) ← r Gen(1 k ), a probabilistic encryption algorithm c ← Enc pk (x; r), and a deterministic decryption algorithm x ← Dec sk (c). It is required that if (pk, sk) ← r Gen(1 k ), then for any x and r from corresponding domains, Dec sk (Enc pk (x; r)) = x.
The rate of Π is the length of a plaintext divided by the length of its ciphertext. The rate can be a function of . A cryptosystem is CPA-secure if for any x 0 and x 1 (possibly chosen by the adversary) of the same length, given pk and an encryption Enc pk (x β ; r) for randomly chosen β ∈ {0, 1} and r, no probabilistic polynomialtime adversary can guess β with probability 1 2 +ε, where ε is non-negligible in k.
Damgård-Jurik Cryptosystem
Assume is the length of the plaintexts in bits. The Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem [11] allows to encrypt plaintexts for arbitrary ≥ 1, so that the ciphertext length is not more than + 2k. Therefore, it has rate 1 − o (1). The cryptosystem is defined as follows.
To generate the public and secret keys, one lets N = pq to be a k-bit RSA modulus for two randomly generated k/2-bit primes p and q. The value N is the public key pk, and the factorization (p, q) of N is a part (together with some additional information that makes decrypting more efficient) of the secret key sk.
To encrypt an -bit string x, one chooses a length parameter s such that = s · k (or s = /k if k ), chooses a randomizer r ← r Z * N , and then outputs
Decryption can be done efficiently, see [11] . Clearly, the plaintext belongs to Z N s while the ciphertext belongs to Z N s+1 , that is, has the bitlength ≤ log 2 N s+1 ≤ (s + 1)k bits. Due to the choice of s, the bitlength of the plaintext is at least (s − 1)k. The rate of Damgård-Jurik is |x|/|c| ≥ (s − 1)/(s + 1). If → ∞, then = |x| ≈ s · k, and the rate is ≈ 1 − 1/s. This cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, since
Recall that arithmetic in the first (resp., second) parameter of Enc is done modulo N s (resp., N ).
The CPA-security of the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem is based on the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption of Paillier [33] .
CPIR
In an (n, 1)-CPIR (computationally-private information retrieval, [22] ) protocol for -bit strings, the server has a database of n elements, f = (f 0 , . . . , f n−1 ), each f i being bits long, and the client has an input x ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}. The client needs to obtain f x , while no probabilistic polynomial-time server should obtain any information about x. It is also required that the total communication complexity of the CPIR protocol is smaller than in the trivial case where the server just sends the whole database to the server.
A two-message CPIR protocol consists of the following three steps.
1. First, the client generates a secret/public key pair (sk, pk) ← r KGCPIR(1 k ), and sends to the server pk and a query c = Que pk (n, , x; r); the latter depends on the security parameter k, the size of the database n, the length of the database elements , the client's input x, and some random coins r. 2. Second, the server replies with C ← Rep pk ( f , c;r) that depends on the server's input f , the query c, and another randomizerr. 3. Third, the client recovers f x ← Ans sk (n, , C), given access to C, n, , and the secret key sk.
It is required that for any valid key pair (sk, pk) ← r KGCPIR(1 k ) and any valid inputs ( f , x) and randomizers (r,r),
The (CPA-)security notion is similar to the one of cryptosystems, see, e.g., [25] .
The rate rate(Γ) of a two-message CPIR protocol Γ is the number of "useful bits" (that is, log 2 n+ ) divided by the total communication |Que|+|Rep| of the protocol. We do not include pk to the communication, since the same pk can (and will) be reused in many instantiation of CPIR protocols. Even if pk not reused, its length is minimal (e.g., |pk| = k = o (1) bits in the next example) and does hence not influence the rate significantly.
We remark that multi-server PIR protocols [7] do not rely on computational assumptions and are usually computationally more efficient than single-server CPIR protocols. However, such protocols have strongly subconstant rate and moreover, are not secure unless some of the servers are honest, an assumption that is not realistic in many scenarios.
Basic CPIR
The new LHE scheme of Sect. 4 is based on a careful recursion built on top of Lipmaa's two-message (w, 1)-CPIR protocol [25] for small w. The two main properties that we use is that (i) it is based on additively homomorphic encryption without any recursion (and thus must have linear-in-n communication, [32] ), and (ii) it's server communication has rate-(1−o (1)). Our construction in Sect. 4 is an efficient reduction of such a basic CPIR protocol to one that has rate 1 − o (1) .
In this (w, 1)-CPIR protocol, the client generates secret and public key (sk, pk), with pk = N , for the 
Sincer is random, then C is a random encryption of f x . The client obtains f x by decrypting C,
Clearly, the server's answer is a random encryption of f x . Since the server only sees encrypted messages, the CPA-security of (w, 1)-Lipmaa's CPIR protocol immediately follows from the CPA-security of the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem, and thus, from the DCR assumption. Here, for s = /k (and ignoring pk), |Que| = (w − 1)(s + 1)k and |Rep| = (s + 1)k , (2) and thus it has rate log w + |Que| + |Rep| ≈ 1 w .
However, its server-rate is (log w + )/|Rep| = 1 − o (1). Due to the construction of the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem, x and f x must be encrypted by using the same length parameter s: if x was encrypted by using a parameter z < s, then the server's answer would encrypt f x mod N z and thus the server would not recover the whole value f x . More discussion on this issue is provided in [26] . 
LHE: Definitions
We introduce leveled homomorphic encryption for LBP, following the terminology of Gentry [16] . However, the definition will be somewhat different. 
This is since the public moduli, used when encrypting, (and thus also the public key) depend on m.
The new (slightly stronger) definition requires the existence of a single key pair (sk, pk) usable for any m. Since the public key does not fix m, it has to be the client -who sends her message first -who picks the value m while encrypting the messages. The value m gives an upper bound on the length of the large-output branching program that the server can evaluate on these ciphertexts. Optimal rate is achieved if m is equal to the actual length of the evaluated large-output branching program. For this reason, in the definition we will concentrate on the case of level m branching programs. Since the rate in our case will be defined as the total length of the client's and the server's messages, it is natural that the client has to choose the parameter m, based on her knowledge of the server's input, to optimize the rate. Similar problem exists in leveled FHE.
The following definition formalizes this intuition. It is required that for any valid key pair (sk, pk), message x, randomizers r andr, and a polynomial-size branching program P f of length m,
A leveled LHE scheme must satisfy two security requirements, CPA-security and branching program privacy (similar to circuit-privacy, [16, 17] ). The first one is defined similarly to the case of arbitrary public-key cryptosystems, though one has to take into account the presence of Eval, see [16, 17] , for a formal definition. However, to achieve optimal rate we allow the outputs of Enc m and Eval to come from different distributions;
we just require that the output of Eval does not reveal any unnecessary information about the evaluated branching program except its length. We require that the LHE scheme Π be communicationefficient in the sense that its rate
is as large as possible. Informally, Π is optimal-rate, if the rate is 1 − o (1) as a function of .
The rate takes into account the value |Enc|, since it is possible to choose parameters so that |Eval| is very small while |Enc| is very large. It is also a natural measurement of the rate in many applications like (n, 1)-CPIR. Similarly, the communication complexity of a leveled LHE scheme is equal to |Enc| + |Eval|.
Construction
In what follows, we propose a leveled LHE scheme that securely computes the values of any function f : {0, . . . , w − 1} χ → {0, 1} , f ∈ LBP, with the rate as in Eq.
(1). Here, m is the length of a polynomial-size w-ary leveled branching program P f that implements f . Since in the intended applications, χmk, the rate will approach 1 when increases. In the current section, the leveled LHE scheme will be parameterized; the claimed communication complexity and the rate will be achieved in Sect. 5 where we propose the optimal values of the parameters. For related notations about LBP, and the Lipmaa's CPIR protocol, we refer to Sect. 2.
High-Level Strategy
Following [20] , the general strategy of our construction is as follows. Recall that in a w-ary branching program P f , the label (that we denote by L v ) of a node v, indexed by X ind(v) , is equal to L child(v,X ind(v) ) . If privacy has to be preserved, this operation can be executed by applying the Rep function of a basic (w, 1)-CPIR protocol to a query Que(. . . ) corresponding to the value of X ind(v) , and to the database
Instead of sending L v to the client, the server stores L v so that it can be later be used recursively to compute the label of v's parent. Finally, the server returns to the client only the value of L size(P f ) and the client uses the function Ans recursively to obtain f x from this.
This general strategy was introduced in [22] , albeit with an inefficient basic (w, 1)-CPIR protocol (that resulted in super-polylogarithmic communication for the recursive construction), and it has been used in many subsequent works. At every node in the branching pro-
Fig. 2. Local computation of Lv
gram P f to be evaluated, we use an efficient (w, 1)-CPIR protocol, preceded and succeeded with well-chosen noncryptographic operations (more precisely, splitting and concatenating bit-strings), to obtain optimal rate.
Detailed Description
We utilize a two-message (w, 1)-CPIR protocol with a short reply |Rep|. More precisely, we use Lipmaa's (w, 1)-CPIR protocol Γ = (KGCPIR, Que, Rep, Ans) (see Sect. 2). We recall that then, |Que| and |Rep| are as in Eq. (2), where s = /k . We also need the existence of the Compress function (see Sect. 2). We will summarize in Fig. 3 . However, we first have to establish the optimality.
In the new LHE scheme (see Fig. 3 for a full description), on input x (plus pk and public parameters like m and s ← ( c 1 , . . . , c χ ) .
Parse c as c = ( c 1 , . . . , c χ ) . · k, x i ; ·) by using a fresh randomizer. The vector of those queries is the LHE encryption of x that is sent to the server. Note that x i corresponds to an assignment to the formal variable X i .
The server evaluates, by using function Eval, a branching program P f on encrypted x. Eval pk (P f , c;r) inputs a w-ary leveled branching program P f and the queries c i corresponding to assignments to all X i . Recall that the choice of P f fixes L v for all sinks v ≤ n, where n is the total number of sink nodes in P f . Eval recursively computes L v for all non-sink nodes whose children already have assigned labels L child(v,i) . Finally, Eval returns the label L size(P f ) of the source.
Up to now, the construction is not very different from those in [20, 26] . The crux of the new construction is in how exactly L v is evaluated. Namely, at every nonsink node v, Eval does the following. (See Fig. 2 
For the sake of simplicity, in our theoretical analysis we allow t i to be non-integers. In practice, one must use appropriate integer ceiling functions. If is large enough, the latter causes a very small change; we will give a numerical example in Sect. 7.1. Eval writes
where This means that at the end of the protocol, L size(P f ) is equal to the m-times recursive (and parallel) application of Rep to f x . From this, the decrypter can obtain f x from L size(P f ) by recursively applying Ans sk to it. In our case, L size(P f ) ( 
and the intermediate values) is interpreted as a concatenation of t d bitstrings, and
Ans sk is applied to each piece separately. The answers are concatenated again, and the result is given as an input to Ans sk of the next level. The algorithms KG(1 k ), Proof. The correctness of the construction is obvious. The branching program privacy is clear, since the decrypter only sees a number of (m − 1)-times application of Rep to an output of Que, and it is guaranteed by the definition of privacy that the input to the query does not depend on the branching program.
Next, if an adversary is able to break the CPAsecurity of the leveled LHE scheme, then via a standard hybrid argument she is also able to break the CPAsecurity of the underlying CPIR protocol. Fig. 3 . The computation of Eval pk is dominated by 
Theorem 2. Let Π be the leveled LHE scheme from
Proof. The computational complexity is obvious. For the communication complexity, clearly,
Thus, |Eval pk (P f , c;r)| = t m s m k is equal to
This gives the claimed communication complexity.
Finding Optimal Parameters
Next, we find the optimal parameters that result in the best possible rate for the leveled LHE scheme from Sect. 4. More precisely, our goal is to find optimal length parameters s d , as a function of . As we will see, this optimization problem has quite an unexpected solution. We now briefly summarize our strategy. First, we show by using standard methods of multivariable calculus that the communication is minimized when the length parameters s d used at every level are all equal, s 1 = · · · = s m =: s. Second, we show that the optimal s is defined as the unique positive root of a certain degree-(m + 1) polynomial. Third, since there is no general algebraic solution to this polynomial (except for m < 4), we find a Puiseux series for the unique positive root s (and also for the communication and rate, given optimal s). Fourth, we describe an efficient log m-time algorithm to find an integer approximation for the optimal value s. As we will show, this results in rate that is very close to 1 in practically relevant scenarios.
Rewording the Optimization Problem
In App. A, we show that 
Now, ∂com/∂s
∂com/∂s = 0 if and only if s is a root of the univariate polynomial f m (·, σ), where
According to the Descartes' rule of signs, f m (·, σ) has exactly one positive real root for each m > 0. Thus, this unique positive real root s minimizes the function com.
Computing Puiseux Series
The famous theorem of Abel-Ruffini states that polynomial equations of degree n ≥ 5 are not solvable by radicals (see, e.g., [35] ). In particular, by using Galois theory we can show that the polynomial f m (x, 1) is not solvable in radicals for say m = 4 (see Sect. 6); one can prove a similar result for any even m ≥ 4. Since we are interested in a solution s of f m (s, σ) for all m and well-chosen σ, we apply the classical NewtonPuiseux method [39] which can be used given any polynomial f . The polynomial f m (x, y) ∈ R[x, y] can be considered as an algebraic curve on a plane. The Puiseux series are power series with fractional exponents. Computing a power series expansion for y can be seen as solving a polynomial equation in one variable over the field of Puiseux series. Since the field of formal Puiseux series is algebraically closed (see Theorem 3.1 from [39] ), a root can always be found. Although this method involves a power series substitution and solving equations at the determination of each expansion coefficient, it is rather simple in our case of the unique root, demanding only two iterations.
More precisely, the Puiseux series of g(x) is a series of type g(x) = ∞ i=0 a i x i/n , where n is some integer.
We use the Newton-Puiseux algorithm [39] to find the Puiseux series for the unique positive root s of f m . By the previous discussion, this will also be the Puiseux series for the value of s that minimizes com. First, it is known [39] that the Puiseux series exists, i.e., s = ∞ i=0 a i σ i/n for some a i and n. We find this series by assuming that
and then finding c i and γ i one by one. The exponents γ i are defined as certain slopes of the Newton polygon [39] for f m (s, σ) = 0. After a while we form a hypothesis about the general formula for c i and prove it. See Appendix B for a more detailed description of the Newton-Puiseux algorithm and for the proofs of the following theorems.
Theorem 3. Let σ be as in Eq. (7). The Puiseux series of the unique positive root
where 
and rate
See App. C for a detailed statement (with a precise series expression) and a proof. According to the preceding discussion, the above rate is the best possible that one can achieve by using the leveled LHE scheme of Sect. 4, given that the underlying branching program is oblivious and χ = m. However, in the upper bound of Thm. 4 we only need the branching program to be leveled.
Algorithm for Approximation of Root
Next, we propose a simple algorithm that finds the best integer approximation to the unique positive root s of Eq. (8) in ≈ log 2 m steps. Clearly, in our application, an integer approximation is sufficient. Let σ be as defined in Eq. (7). First, we show that for partial sums
, σ) is negative and f m (s (2) , σ) is positive. Since 0 < s (1) < s (2) , we know that the only positive root s of f m (x, σ) is in the interval (s (1) , s (2) ) of length (m − 1)/2. We compute the integer approximation to s (that is sufficient for our purposes) by using binary search over this interval, see Fig. 4 .
Proof. The case m = 1 is trivial. Assume that m ≥ 2.
Fig. 4. Finding integer approximation to root s
It remains to show that f m (s (2) , σ) ≥ 0. Since
lows from the following estimation: 
On Solvability in Radicals
By using well-known methods of the Galois theory, see [27] for more details, we now give a proof sketch that the Galois group of
is the symmetric group S 5 . Since S 5 is not a solvable group, this means that g(x) is not solvable in radicals. First, some background. Let F be a field and f (x) ∈ F [X] be a polynomial of degree n. A splitting field E/F of a polynomial f over F is the smallest field extension E, F ⊂ E, over which the polynomial f decomposes into linear factors, i.e., exist α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ E such that
A polynomial f is called separable if it has n distinct roots in the splitting field E/F of f over F . A splitting field of a separable polynomial f is called Galois extension. The group Aut F (E) of all automorphisms γ of a Galois extension E/F that fix F pointwise, i.e., γ(x) = x for each x ∈ F , is called the Galois group of the extension E/F and is denoted by Gal(E/F ). The Galois group Gal(f (x)) of the polynomial f is then the Galois group of Gal(E/F ). Thus, elements of Galois group are interpreted as permutations of the roots of some polynomial that decomposes over E. It is a well known fact that the Galois group Gal(f (x)) is isomorphic to a subgroup of the symmetric group S n . While it is hard to determine Galois groups in general, special arguments can be exploited sometimes. By discriminant of polynomial f (x) we call the value D f = δ 2 , where
The Galois group Gal(E/F ) ≤ S n is contained in the group of even permutations A n if and only if D f is a square in F . Now, consider the polynomial g(
; it has discriminant 3017 = 7 · 431. Clearly, g(x) is irreducible modulo 2, so it is irreducible over Q. The Dedekind theorem (see [27] , Thm. F13) states that if a polynomial g(x) ∈ Z[x] is factored into irreducible factors modulo a prime not dividing the discriminant, then the Galois group Gal(g(x)), considered as a subgroup of S n , contains a permutation whose cycle type corresponds to the degrees of the irreducible factors. According to Sylow Theorems (see [27] , p. 100), S 5 has plenty different subgroups. Since
by the Dedekind theorem, Gal(g(x)) contains a permutation of the roots with the cycle type (2, 3), i.e., two cycles with length 2 and 3 respectively. Since the order of a permutation of the cycle type (2, 3) is 6, and since the degree of the irreducible polynomial g(x) is 5, the Galois group of g(x) over Q has order divisible by 5 · 6 = 30. As Gal(g(x)) embeds into S 5 , | Gal(g(x))| is either 30, 60, or 120. Since g(x)'s discriminant is not a rational square, Gal(g(x)) is not the only subgroup of order 60, that is A 5 . Because there are no subgroups of S 5 with order 30, this proves that Gal(g(x)) = S 5 .
Applications

Rate-Optimal CPIR
Given the new leveled LHE scheme, the construction of a rate-optimal (n, 1)-CPIR is straightforward. Following [26] , in the (n, 1)-CPIR protocol, we let the client first generate a new Damgård-Jurik public and secret key pair, and then send to the server the public key together with an encryption of every individual bit of the index x. The server represents her database f as a compact leveled branching program P f that computes the function f where f (x) := f x , and then evaluates securely the client's query on top of it, i.e., P f has n sink nodes, each with an -bit label. The client obtains the encrypted source value, and then decrypts it.
When using the new leveled LHE scheme, the computational and communication complexity of the CPIR protocol are as per Thm. 2. Thus, the resulting CPIR protocol has both optimal rate (when using the parameters derived in Sect. 5), and (given the database is sufficiently redundant) sublinear-in-n computational complexity. If the database is not redundant, then the server represents it as an w-ary tree of length m.
In most of the applications of the LHE, w = 2, which is also often the optimal case. The following corollary shows however that this not always the case. [33] is true. There exists a CPA-secure (n, 1)-CPIR protocol with communication
Corollary 1. Assume that the DCR assumption
Proof. Follows from preceding discussion and Thm. 4 by setting m = χ = log w n, and considering the full w-ary decision tree (note that it is leveled). Thus, the (n, 1)-CPIR protocol has communication
Since w is an integer, the second coefficient in this series is minimized when w = 5.
Numerical Examples
Next, we provide examples with concrete parameters. Consider the setting of (n, 1)-CPIR, where each database element is a movie, and a paying client wishes to obtain privately one movie. Differently from Eq. (4), we also assume here that all the intermediate values t d are integers, that is,
, and
For t m defined accordingly, and recalling that here w = 5 and χ = m = log w n (and, w.l.o.g., assuming that n is a power of w), this changes the communication function from Eq. (6) to
Assume that k = 2048, 
Rate-Optimal Oblivious Transfer
A 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT) protocol is a 1-outof-n CPIR protocol that also satisfies server's privacy. That is, even a malicious client will get information only about one database element, and not more. There exist various security definitions for OT, and for simplicity we only consider the following one. A 1-out-of-n OT Table 1 . The final value of s and the rate for some protocol is semi-simulatable [29] , if it is a CPIR protocol (i.e., it satisfies client's CPA privacy), and in addition, it satisfies server's privacy in the sense of simulatability. That is, we make a comparison to the ideal model, where there exists a TTP that gets the client's input x, server's input f , and outputs f x . See [29] for more details. Naor and Pinkas [29] proposed an efficient transformation from any 1-out-of-n CPA-secure CPIR protocol to a semi-simulatable 1-out-of-n OT protocol that makes one call to the CPIR protocol, and a logarithmic number of calls to 1-out-of-2 OT protocols and a linear number of calls to a pseudorandom function.
More precisely, assume the server's database is f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ), where |f i | = and the client input is x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) , where x i ∈ {0, 1}. The server first selects randomly 2 keys (k [29] for possible optimizations.) The two parties first run the optimal-rate CPIR protocol to transmit f x ; then they run 1-out-of-2 OT protocols to transmit the corresponding keys k xi i . It is known that 1-out-of-2 OT protocols can be constructed with a constant rate [30] ; moreover, the key size is much smaller than the . It is easy to see that this transformation preserves the rate. [33] The Naor-Pinkas transformation only offers computational server privacy due to the reliance on pseudorandom number generators. Aiello, Ishai, and Reingold [1] proposed another rate-preserving CPIR-to-OT transformation that results in information-theoretic server's privacy. Their transformation assumes that the CPIR protocol uses a homomorphic public-key cryptosystem where the plaintext group has a prime order. Laur and Lipmaa [23] modified the Aiello-Ishai-Reingold transformation to work with the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem. However, the Laur-Lipmaa transformation -that relies on concrete properties of the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem -is not rate preserving. We leave the construction of a CPIR-to-OT transformation that is simultaneously rate-preserving, guarantees information-theoretic server's privacy, and works on top of Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem, as an open problem. Finally, to achieve the stronger security notion of simulatability [5] , instead of using the Naor-Pinkas transformation, the encrypter can accompany each of his χ ciphertexts with a standard zero-knowledge proof [10, 11] that it encrypts a Boolean value, and then prove that their sum encrypts 1. The total communication complexity of the zero-knowledge proofs is
Corollary 2. Assume that the DCR assumption
(This approach works when w = 2, in the case w > 2 one can use efficient range proofs [4, 6, 24] .) The main drawback of this approach, compared to the Naor-Pinkas transformation, is reliance on zero-knowledge proofs. This either increases the number of rounds, or forces one to rely on the random oracle model.
Rate-Optimal SCOT
A 1-out-of-n strong conditional oblivious transfer ((n, 1)-SCOT, [2] ) protocol for function Q (s.t. Q(x, y) ∈ [n]) implements securely the following functionality:
That is, on client's input x and server's input f , the client obtains f Q(x,y) and the server outputs nothing. In the case of OT, Q(x, y) = x. The semi-simulatable security of the SCOT is defined similarly like the semisimulatable security of OT.
One can use the new rate-optimal leveled LHE scheme to construct an efficient SCOT protocol for the functionality F Q−SCOT (x, (y, f )), where Q ∈ LBP has a polynomial-size large-output branching program P Q , as follows. Let P Q be the large-output branching program, obtained from P Q by just replacing each leaf value i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with f i . It is easy to see that applying the new LHE scheme with P Q results in a SCOT protocol that implements F Q−SCOT . The rate efficiency in a SCOT protocol is equally important for practical use when the data size is large. We note that optimal-rate SCOT can find applications in a similar setting as our optimal-rate CPIR (but for more complex content selection strategies); for instance consider a client that wishes to watch one out of q variants of a video stream where each variant has inserted different style of advertisements. If Q(x) is a BP that produces the index of the video stream variant based on client preferences x then, using our SCOT, the client can stream the video that matches her advertisement preferences without revealing them to the server.
In a recent paper [21] , the authors showed how to construct an optimal-rate asymmetric fingerprinting protocol from a rate optimal SCOT for the relation Q(x, y) = [x ≤ y], thus answering an open question related to efficient asymmetric fingerprinting codes.
On Computational Complexity
In this section, we will analyze the computation complexity of the new CPIR protocol (analysis of the LHE can be done similarly). We show that the new CPIR protocol is significantly more computation efficient for the server than the protocols from [25, 26] , an that one can further improve it significantly while decreasing the rate only by a small factor. We emphasize that the following analysis is theoretical, since we lack an implementation. The server's computational complexity of the previously known variants of the (n, 1)-CPIR protocol from [25, 26] and of the resulting leveled LHE schemes [20] is quite high, due to the need to encrypt larger and larger plaintexts during the processing of the branching program. Since one Damgård-Jurik encryption with -bit modulus takes time Ω( 2 log log log ), when using FFT-based multiplication (in our applications, is large enough for FFT-based multiplication to perform faster than Karatsuba), elongation of plaintexts is extremely detrimental to computational complexity. In the new CPIR protocol, we encrypt many shorter plaintexts. Next, we will give an estimate on the server's computation. It is dominated by n − 1 encryptions. More precisely, assuming that an encryption (resp., an exponentiation) with plaintext length s d k takes time T Enc (s d , k) (resp., T exp (s d , k) ), the server's computation is dominated by
bit-operations. According to [13] 
(For the sake of simplicity, we omit the log log(
To estimate the server's computation, we note that for large , t d = Θ( /k). Thus, in bit operations, the server's computational complexity is dominated by
For example, the server computation in the CPIR protocol of [25] with the parameters (k = 2048, = 10 6 · k, n = 5 7 ) given in Sect. 7.1.1, is (when generously forgetting all constants and the log log-term) at least 2 n log ≈ 2 83.0676 bit-operations. The rate-1/2 variant of this CPIR, proposed in [26] , has server's computation of at least ( / log n) 2 n/ log n·log( / log n) ≈ 2 78.3152 bitoperations. With the same parameters, the new CPIR protocol has server computation ≈ 2 73.5408 . While this number is still huge, omitting small constant factors, it is approximately 2 10 (resp., 2 5 ) times smaller than the computation in the CPIR protocol of [25] (resp., [26] ).
Optimization by Parallelization
Since the server's computation is super-linear in , a simple solution to reduce it is to execute the CPIR protocol 
where for s computed as on Fig. 4 , t m is computed recursively from t 0 = /(s · k) , and
Here, we assume that λ | . Using the same parameters as in Sect. 7.1.1 (k = 2048, n = 5 7 , and either = 10 4 · k or = 10 6 · k;
we note that the case λ > s does not make sense), we calculated the rate and logarithm of the server's computation for some values of λ, see Tbl. 2. More precisely, the last column of Tbl. 2 has the value log 2 ( The preceding discussion indicates that the actual rate function (and not only the fact that it is 1−o(1)) of the CPIR protocol matters: if the rate function would be even slightly smaller, it might happen that using (say) λ = 250 would result in the much worse rate. With the new CPIR protocol, choosing a large λ introduces only a minor change to the rate.
Further Work
We expect that one can apply many more optimizations, but we leave their study (together with an optimized implementation) for a future work. We only mention that one can implement the λ-parallel version on λ different servers, as done say in [34] in the context of the CPIR protocol from [18] . This reduces the computation of every single server by an additional factor of λ; however, in this case the client's communication complexity will increase λ times to λ(w − 1)χ(s + 1)k ≈ 2λ · √ k log 2 n. See [14, 15, 31] and references therein for other possible optimizations. We will leave it as an another open question to construct a version of the new CPIR protocol that has the best trade-offs between rate and server's computation.
To conclude, we think that the new CPIR protocol (if considered as a reduction that utilizes an existing cryptosystem) by itself is also computationally efficient. The main bottleneck is clearly in the underlying cryptosystem. Hence, an important open question posed by the current work is to construct an optimal-rate additively homomorphic cryptosystem with significantly faster computational (encryption) complexity compared to the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem. 
A Derivation of Global Minimum
Here we give some details and explanations to Section 5. To determine a minimum of the multivariable communication function com we use the generalization of the second derivative test for multivariable functions [38] .
Assuming that the rest of the parameters are fixed, the function com of Eq. Recall m = χ. Assume for the sake of simplicity that the branching program is oblivious. Without this assumption, the number of ciphertexts with some length parameter can depend on the result of the following optimization, and this results in a vicious circle. This may mean that there exist cases of non-oblivious branching programs, where the derived result is not optimal. However, as emphasized before, in all our applications we in fact have oblivious branching programs.
Under this assumption, the client will send one ciphertext with every possible length parameter s d . Thus, it is easy to see that We will not define positive and semipositive definite matrices. Instead, we apply the Sylvester's criterion of positive definitiveness: a matrix M is positive definite iff the determinants associated with all upper-left submatrices of M are positive, [28] . We first compute 
B Proof of Thm. 3
Proof. Given a polynomial f (x, y), it is always possible to solve it for y in terms of x by means of a fractional power series y = ∞ i=0 c i x Σ i j=0 γj , so called Puiseux series. This method is based on the algebraic closure of the field of fractional power series (the Puiseux's Theorem), while the proof of Puiseux Theorem can be given constructively by the Newton polygon method. We give first a general description of the Newton-Puiseux algorithm and then apply it to Eq. (8). More details can be found in Chapter IV, Sect. 1-3 of [39] . Let f (x, y) = a 0 (x) + a 1 (x)y + · · · + a n (x)y n be a polynomial of degree n > 0, with a n = 0. We will recursively construct a solution y(x), a Puiseux series in The terms of lowest order must cancel, whence we obtain c 0 . One can determine the possible value for γ 0 by considering the Newton polygon of f . This is the smallest convex polygon in the affine plane over Q, which contains all the points P i = (i, j) from the expansion of f (x, y(x)). Those faces of the Newton polygon, s.t. all the P i 's lie on or above the corresponding line, have possible values for γ 0 as their negative slopes. After γ 0 and c 0 have been determined, the same process is performed on y 1 (x), which must be a root of the equation 
